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1. Introduction
1.1. Problems to be addressed
Wind power is an important renewable energy source;
however, wind power investments in Norway have so
far been limited. To obtain investments, two basic
conditions must be in place: 1) investors must consider
the profitability and the risk to be acceptable, and 2)
they need a project-licence from the government. The
argument put forward in this article is that there is a lack
of predictability in the Norwegian licencing system for
wind power, which introduces an extra risk element for
investors, in addition to the ordinary financial risk, and
thus dampens investors’ engagement in the Norwegian
wind power market.
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ABSTRACT
The Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (MoPE) manages the licencing system for Norwegian
wind power. Balancing relevant concerns in this process could be considered as Environmental
Policy Integration (EPI) in practical wind power policy. Wind power investments have been
limited in Norway, investors have left the market and those remaining are jittery towards making
investments. This article argues that the licencing system is partially responsible for this
situation; the system has, over time, introduced an extra risk element for investors, challenged
their patience and hampered investments. Especially MoPE’s handling of appeals has been time
consuming and difficult to predict regarding final outcome. The problem is probably lack of
common understanding between MoPE and Ministry of Climate and Environment (MoCE) on
how EPI works in practical wind power policy. To speed up investments the pace in the licencing
process must be increased and the criteria for balancing relevant interest must be clarified.
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The licencing process for wind power—in Norway
managed MoPE—could be linked to the concept of
Environmental Policy Integration, EPI. The basic idea of
EPI is that it should lead to sustainable development by
putting environmental objectives on par with existing
economic and social sector objectives [1, p28]. The
Norwegian licencing process for wind power could be
regarded as the practical exercise of accomplishing EPI
in wind power policy— economic and political benefits
from diffusion of wind power should be balanced
against negative impact on the environment. However,
environmental policy is managed by MoCE, and thus
the coordination between two separated policy sectors
and ministries could create EPI challenges. Therefore,
EPI is used as a reference for the discussion in this
article.
Investors entering into wind power in Norway face an
endurance test. The time consumed from the first field
studies to realised projects, is in most cases more than
ten years. The licencing process has been particularly
time-consuming, taking five years in averages [2, p53].
Additionally, the outcome of some of the governmental
resolutions has by some stakeholders been described as
unexpected—for instance, MoPE’s decision to reject the
Moifjellet project, which will be discussed below.
For investors, unexpected use of time and uncertainty
about the final governmental resolutions (yes or no)
increase spending and the number of projects investors
must develop and put into the licencing process. Hence,
experiences with the efficiency and predictability in the
licencing process could influence on the investors
willingness to go into, remain and invest in the
Norwegian wind power market.
In this context two claims are put forward:
First, the environmental policy integration (EPI) in
the Norwegian licencing system for wind power
has been inconsistent and leads to an inefficient
and unpredictable licencing system.
Second, this system has negatively impacted
investors’ willingness to invest in the Norwegian
wind power market. Moreover, if not revised, it
will have a negative impact on future
investments in wind power in Norway.
The article builds on data from the public
administrations and the governmental documents
dealing with the final resolution and interviews with
investors, representatives from the central directorates,
local authorities and NGOs. News coverage and press
statements from the government are also included.
1.2. Wind power’s role in Norway
In 2011, approximately 96% of Norway’s electricity
production was generated from hydropower [3, p24].
Though, the government still promotes increased
production of electricity from renewable sources, among
other things motivated by an expressed ambitious climate-
and renewable energy policy. Moreover, the hydropower
system is vulnerable to shortages in rainfall and the
protection of river systems has become an important
political issue. Therefore, the government has been
looking for alternative renewable sources, and already in
1999 adopted a 3 TWh onshore wind power production
target to be reached within 2010 [4, section 4.1].
The Norwegian west coast offers wind speeds above
8 m/s, and NVE has calculated the onshore wind power
potential in Norway, all outside factors excluded, to be
250 TWh [5]. In 2001, the Norwegian government
established Enova (enova.no), and one of the purposes
was to subsidise wind power through investment grants.
The Enova scheme was running up to 2010. In spite of
extensive wind resources, the support scheme and the
government’s stated 3 TWh policy target by 2010.
Norway’s wind power capacity is still limited: 704 MW
were running and 1.6 TWh was produced in 2012 [6].
Norway is not a member of the EU, however, because
of the Agreement of the European Economic Area (EEA
agreement), still committed to the EU’s directive on
promoting the use of energy from renewable sources
(the RES directive) [7] and has agreed to increase its
renewable share in the energy consumption from 58% in
2005 to 67.5% by 2020 [8]. The directive and the
commitment comprise the heating and cooling sector,
the electricity sector and the transportation sector. The
Norwegian RES plan, i.e., how to fulfil this 2020
obligation, includes an ambition to increase wind power
production to approximately 8.4 TWh [9, table 10.b];
hence, the pace in wind power investments must grow
rapidly. To promote renewable electricity, a common
green certificate market together with Sweden was set
into operation in 2012 [10]. The goal is to increase
renewable electricity production in the two countries
together by 26.4 TWh by 2020 and thus contribute to the
fulfilment of the two countries’ national RES
obligations. The Swedish RES obligation is a 49 %
renewable share in the consumption by 2020. The
consumer’s certificate obligations are equally shared
between the two countries (13.2 TWh), and 50% of the
common increase in renewable electricity production
could be booked on each country’s RES account. The
market for new production is technology-neutral, and in
contrast to the consumer obligation, independent of
country borders.
2. Theoretical approach: Environmental Policy
Integration
2.1. Environmental Policy Integration
Although the principle of EPI (Environmental Policy
Integration) was not used explicitly in the Brundtland
Report, merging environment and economics in decision
making was seen as one of the critical objectives of
sustainable development [11, p49 and p62−65].
According to Jordan and Lenschow’s interpretation [12,
p147], there was a strong emphasis on “systematically
connecting the seemingly incompatible goals of
economic competitiveness, social development and
environmental protection, and hence to ensure
sustainable development.” The concept of EPI stems
from these concerns. The definition presented by
Hovden and Lafferty [13, p15]) provides a practical
approach to the concept: “Environmental Policy
Integration implies the incorporation of environmental
objectives into all stages of policymaking in non-
environmental policy sectors, with a specific recognition
of this goal as a guiding principle for the planning and
execution of policy”.
Norway has been considered a front-runner in EPI
and has given EPI constitutional status [14]. However,
in 2013, Norway was only ranked tenth in the world on
the overall “Environmental Performance Index”, tenth
on the sub-index on energy and climate and 65th on the
sub-index for biodiversity and habitat [15]. The indexes
rank how well 178 countries perform on high-priority
environmental issues in two broad policy areas:
protection of human health from environmental harm
and protection of ecosystems.
Norwegian policy implementation is based on the
principle of sectorial responsibility: separate ministries
have the duty to accomplish decisions made by the
Parliament within the ministries policy sector and
appurtenant bureaucratic institutions. Thus, the practical
exercise is carried out through numerous “sub-regimes”
and procedures that involve a multiplicity of actors and
levels of responsibility; hence, the trade-offs between
separate political bodies and interests could be a challenge.
In 1996, the government stated that environmental
concerns should be implemented in decision making in all
policy sectors [16, section 3]. However, the implications
for the energy sector are not described explicitly.
Establishing new wind power plants creates EPI
challenges; political goals regarding renewable energy
and emissions reductions must be balanced against their
impact on biodiversity, landscape and the local
communities’ interests. The legal framework for
realisation of renewable energy projects in Norway has
been stable over decades; regarding wind power the
challenge is to balance different concerns related to
relative new technology, by using existing and well-
established laws, planning tools and regulatory
procedures. A key element in performing EPI in
concrete cases is the execution of Impact Assessments
(IAs), and in Norway, there have been provisions for
IAs since 1990 [17]. The IAs shall bring about relevant
knowledge needed to balance the relevant concerns. The
government has also launched a set of supplementary
management tools specially designed for wind power,
which will be discussed below.
2.2. The licencing procedure for wind power
In Norway, projects could only be realised if a licence
(concession) is given in accordance with the Energy
Act [18] enforced by MoPE. Still, the authority to
govern the process and assign licences is delegated to
NVE. However, every party in the process could
appeal NVE’s resolution to MoPE. Wind power has
become controversial in Norway, especially local
acceptance has been a challenge, and most cases are
appealed [19]. MoPE is governed by the cabinet
minister; thus, the final resolution is a political
decision. This is in contrast to for instance Sweden,
where appeals are handled by a court of law
(vindlov.se). Municipalities have no legal power in the
process; still, the government would in most cases not
approve projects that lack local support. The
governmental institutions in charge of environmental
matters, managed by MoCE, have a somewhat diffuse
role in the decision-making process; they have no legal
power but serve in an advisory role. MoCE is consulted
when NVE works out the IA programs; additionally,
the MDir, one of MoCE’s directorates, works out
“Thematic Conflict Assessments” (see explanation
below). Additionally, before MoPE makes a final
resolution, there are consultations with MoCE; yet,
documents from these consultations are not publicly
accessible [20]. The licencing process is illustrated
stepwise in figure 1.
Planning tools especially designed for the licencing
process for wind power:
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In 2005, the government launched the “Thematic
Conflict Assessments”, the TCAs [22]. When the
investor has announced that a new project is under
review (by submitting a notification to NVE), MDir, the
defence interests, the reindeer management and the
cultural heritage management should give grades in 
the range A to E, describing the project’s impact on
national and sectorial interests [23]. Grade A represents
no conflict, while grade E represents severe conflict and
is by many considered as a showstopper. The TCAs are
based on the directorates’ professional knowledge;
however, before the NVE makes a conclusion, the TCAs
are reconsidered on the basis of the information
identified in the IAs. The TCAs could be considered as
a tool to highlight issues of national importance when
exercising EPI in the wind power sector. Additionally,
in 2007, MoPE and MoCE introduced guidelines for
planning and localisation of wind power schemes. The
intention was to arrange for the expansion of wind
power within a long-term context, to contribute to the
efficiency of the licencing process and to improve the
predictability for investors and for the communities [24,
chapter 1]. The guidelines triggered county plans for
wind power in some counties—for instance, in
Rogaland [25], where the example cases in this article
are located.
3. The efficiency and predictability in the
licencing system
3.1. Efficiency and predictability in general
Calculations based on information from NVE, on all
clarified projects by August 2013 [26], indicate that the
average time from the applications being submitted to
NVE until the final decisions in MoPE was 3.7 years;
NVE used 2.1 years, and MoPE used 1.6 years - though,
in extreme cases the total case-handling time has been
more than eight years (e.g. the project Sleneset in
Nordland). According to the Office of the Auditor
General of Norway [Riksrevisjonen], which has
investigated the licensing process in NVE and MoPE for
projects handled in the period 2010 to 2013, the time
consumed in NVE was three years on average, and the
average time consumed in MoPE was two years— a
total of five years from application to final resolution
[2]. These data, compared with the data above, indicate
that the case-handling time has increased somewhat
during the last years.
Comparable data from time consumed in the
licencing process from other countries is not easily
available, but a report from Swedish Energy Agency
[Energimyndigheten] concluded that the average case-
handling time for renewable energy projects in Sweden
was 2.7 years and that appeals increased this time by 39
weeks [27, p14]. Though, not fully comparable, the
handling of applications, and especially the handling of
appeals, seems to be more time consuming in Norway
than in Sweden.
Regarding status in the licencing process, table 1
illustrates the situation in August 2013.
Perhaps the most interesting observation from table 1
2 is the comprehensive number of projects waiting for
clarification in MoPE; approximately 9 500 GWh.
Table 1 also illustrates the predictability as regards the
final outcome. 22 of the proposed projects have been
turned down, and 50 projects have been approved.
However, regarding energy volume, approximately
50% have been approved and 50% have been rejected.
In eight of the cases, MoPE has overruled NVE, and
turned yes to no.
3.2. An example from the Bjerkreim cluster: The
Gravdal and Moifjellet projects
The Bjerkreim region in the county of Rogaland, in the
south-western part of Norway, offers wind speeds above
8 m/s, capacity in the national transmission grid, and
municipalities, landowners and local inhabitants
generally in favour of wind power. Development of
projects in Bjerkreim region began in 2003, and in 2007,
investors applied for licences for a total of seven
projects, Gravdal and Moifjellet included. The seven
projects constitute the Bjerkreim cluster. The NVE
coordinated the licencing process for the projects and
the most controversial issues were the impact on birds of
prey and the Eagle Owl. In 2009, six of the projects,
among them Gravdal and Moifjellet, were approved by
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Figure 1: The licencing process and the involved
figures (authors own based on [21]).
NVE. However, the NVE’s decisions were appealed to
MoPE, and in 2012 MoPE made the final decision and
assigned licences for five of the projects. Gravdal was
among the approved projects, while the decision for
Moifjellet was reversed - the project was rejected by
MoPE [29]. A total of 426 MW with an expected annual
energy production of approximately 1.3 TWh could now
be realised. The basic information for Gravdal and
Moifjellet is provided in table 2.
The final resolution for the two projects reads as
follows (abbreviated):
”The Ministry emphasizes that Gravdal could
contribute with a substantial amount of
renewable energy. Based on an overall
evaluation the Ministry concludes that the
advantages exceed the negative impact the
project could cause. The project is therefore
approved.
Realization of Moifjellet could cause severe negative
impact on biodiversity. Even if the level of
conflict is uncertain the Ministry states that the
potential negative impact on bird of prey is not
in accordance with the precautionary principle
in the biodiversity act (...). Despite of the good
wind recourses MoPE’s evaluation is that the
advantages do not exceed the negative impacts
the project could cause on biodiversity,
especially on birds of prey. The application for
Moifjellet is therefore refused” ([29, p35, p36
and p40], authors translation).
4. The licencing system and EPI in wind power
policy—balancing of environmental concerns
4.1. What happened in Bjerkreim?
The intention of the discussion below is not to argue
against MoPE’s decisions, but with EPI in mind, to
discuss the political consistency in the process.
According to table 2, the governmental handling of
the cases for the entire cluster took five years: 2.5 years
in NVE and 2.5 years in MoPE. Time consumed in NVE
is understandable; the work to coordinate the IAs, the
design of internal transmission grid in the cluster and
arrange for meetings with stakeholders was
comprehensive. However, it is more difficult to
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Table 1. Status in August 2013. Includes projects with capacity >10 MW (Authors calculations based on [26, 28]).
Capacity Energy a Number 
(MW) (GWh) of projects
Running 704 2 110 23
Approved by NVE/MoPE (running included) 2 995 8 985 50
Applied but not clarified by NVE 4 015 12 040 43
Approved by NVE, but not clarified by MoPE 3 190 9 570 25
Rejected by NVE/MoPE 2 755 8 265 22
NVE’s approval turned down by MoPE 345 1 035 8
a = Indicative figures, capacity factor assumed to be 0.34.
Table 2. Basic information for Gravdal and Moifjellet projects. (Based on [26, 29 and 30]).
Gravdal Moifjellet
Owner/applicant Fred Olsen Renewables Statkraft Agder Energi Vind DA
Capacity (MW) 90 150
Expected energy production (GWh) 270 450
Area (km2 ) 9 15
Notification 19 Dec. 2003 7 June 2005
TCA, biodiversity D - E D
TCA, landscape B - C C
Applied 8 Aug. 2007 28 June 2007
Resolution (NVE) 16 Dec. 2009
Outcome (NVE) Concession Concession
Final resolution (MoPE) 5 July 2012
Outcome (MoPE) Concession Refused
Case handling time NVE: 2.5 years, MoPE years: 2.5. Total: 5 years
understand why MoPE needed 2.5 years clarify the
appeals—the basic information was in place, and MoPE
could concentrate on the most controversial issues. An
article in Teknisk Ukeblad (TU) [Technology Weekly],
refers to a meeting between MoCE and several investors
some months before the final decision in Bjerkreim was
made [31], and here, the minister, at that time Erik
Solheim, representing the Socialist Party [Sosialistisk
Venstreparti, SV], admitted that the case-handling time
was too long. However, he also noted that the investors
could not expect shortcuts and that it was important to
find criteria to separate good projects from bad projects.
He also expressed that actions to speed up the process
would be taken in both MoCE and MoPE. The article
illustrates MoCE’s somewhat diffuse role in wind power
matters; the minister who gives the statement has no
legal power, but it is seemingly an important player.
Moreover, the statement confirms that the government
struggles to find criteria for balancing interests managed
by two different ministries; i.e., EPI is a challenge.
MoPE’s resolution for Moifjellet was controversial,
and by many of the involved parties described as
unexpected and difficult to understand. NVE had
approved both projects and the resolutions were equally
formulated for Moifjellet and for Gravdal [30, p219 and
p228]. Additionally, the TCAs did not indicate that
Moifjellet was more controversial than Gravdal.
Moreover, the hosting municipality Bjerkreim, had been
in favour of both projects during the entire development
process. The county manager [Fylkesmannen] and some
NGO’s had been sceptical; however, compared with
other projects in Norway, the projects had not been
exceptionally controversial.
Regarding MoPE’s evaluations, the most interesting
observation is what was not included in MoPE’s
argument [29]. First, MoPE did not comment on the
TCAs. The TCAs stated that the MDir was more
sceptical towards Gravdal (table 2) regarding the impact
on biodiversity (D-E) than it was towards Moifjellet (D),
and less negative towards Gravdal under the landscape
category (B-C versus C). Thus, the TCAs indicate that
realisation of Gravdal could really be questioned; grade
E is by some regarded as a showstopper. Regardless of
the conclusion that can be drawn from the TCAs, it is
interesting to observe that they were not examined by
MoPE. The observation is particularly interesting
because MoCE probably provided considerable
influence on MoPE’s decision; thus, MoCE seemed to
ignore the evaluations performed by its own sectorial
directorate (MDir). Second, NVE instructed the
developers to optimise the cluster’s internal
transmission grid and the connections to the national
transmission grid. Moifjellet was the hub in the cluster’s
internal grid structure and when MoPE refused
Moifjellet, the cluster’s internal grid had to be
redesigned. The extent of the internal grid in the cluster
expanded, resulted in appurtenant increased impact on
the environment and increased construction costs. And
finally, MoPE neither discussed nor opposed to the IAs
worked out by the developers. Thus, it could be stated
that MoPE did not comment on the information brought
about from the most central planning tools regarding
EPI; - the TCAs and the IAs.
Several of the involved actors stated in interviews
that the final decision was based on old-fashioned
political “horse-trading”. The “red-green coalition”, a
coalition between the Labour Party [Arbeiderpartiet,
Ap], the Socialist Party [Sosialistisk Venstreparti, SV]
and the Centre Party [Senterpartiet, Sp] was in power—
the cabinet minister in MoCE was held by SV, and the
cabinet minister in MoPE by the Sp. SV could be
claimed to be more focused on biodiversity than on
renewable energy, and the opposite as regards Sp.
Possibly, to make a political solution feasible, SV had to
get a triumph; to highlight that biodiversity concerns
was important, one of the projects had to be turned
down. In an article in Teknisk Ukeblad after the decision
was made, the minister in MoCE, at that time Bård
Vegar Solhjel (who had recently replaced Erik
Solheim), stated that profitability was a secondary issue
when environmental values are threatened [32]. The
minister in MoPE, then Ola Borten Moe, who was in
charge of the official resolution, did not publicly
commented on these trade-offs.
The final resolutions were in place in 2012, and
assuming three years planning and construction time,
the first turbines could be running in 2015,
approximately 10 years after the development process
started. Nevertheless, realisation of the projects is still
not clarified; the investors have so far (by autumn 2014)
not signed contracts with wind turbine suppliers. Thus,
starting up power production is at least postponed to
2016 or 2017.
4.2. EPI and predictability in the licencing process
Dalen et al. [33] have examined projects clarified by
NVE. They state that out of projects that had required
TCA grade D, 10 projects granted a concession by NVE
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and only three had been rejected. Of the projects that
received E classification, four were granted and three
rejected. In a letter to the MoCE in 2013, MDir
evaluated the efficiency of the TCA instrument. They
claimed that the TCAs do not work as a tool to separate
projects with huge negative impacts on the environment
from projects with less negative impacts, and
additionally, introduction of TCAs has not improved the
predictability for investors [34]. The NGO Bellona has
drawn the same conclusion, and proposed to rearrange
the TCAs [35].
Regarding MoCE’s guidelines for regional planning,
and the plan for wind power in Rogaland, which also
could be regarded as an EPI tool, the Bjerkreim cases
illustrate lack of consistency; neither NVE’s or MoPE’s
resolutions are in accordance with the county plan; the
majority of the approved project areas are situated in
areas not recommended for wind power [29]. As a
consequence of this, the county council has decided to
roll the county plan [36]. However, this observation
could not be generalised; outcomes have been different
in other counties; e.g., in Sør-Trøndelag, where
approved projects [37] and the county plan [38] are
largely in accordance with each other.
Riksrevisjonen [2] has examined the licencing
process for renewable energy, and has concluded that
there is an evident need to improve the process. It is
stated that the case-handling time could be reduced and
MoPE should work out an overall strategy for promotion
of renewable energy and update the guidelines for wind
power to clarify the requirements for the IA works and
methodology. However, Riksrevisjonen does not
comment on the efficiency of the TCAs or on the
coordination between MoPE and MoCE.
Literature on planning (licencing) processes for wind
power are comprehensive, especially evaluations linked
to the social acceptance of wind power (e.g., Aitken [39]
and Devine-Wright [40]). However, concrete
discussions on the connection between EPI, licencing
processes for renewable energy and investments are not
traceable in academic debate. Still, some scholars have
contributed more generally to the Norwegian discussion.
Buen J. [41] has compared long-term technological
change in wind power in Norway and Denmark and has
concluded that policies and measures have been weaker
and less stable in Norway than in Denmark. Blindheim
[42] claims that the long lasting political debate wind
power’s role in the Norwegian energy system has led to
lack of focus and priority in MoPE and thus projects
have accumulated in the licencing process. Ek et al. [43]
has compared historical, institutional and policy-related
differences for wind power development in Denmark,
Sweden and Norway. They claim that the Danish and
Norwegian planning system provides greater scope for
implementing national wind power policy than does the
Swedish system. Petterson and Söderholm [44] support
Ek et al.’s conclusions. However, in contrast to Norway,
the Swedish wind power production has grown rapidly
during recent years (8.7 TWh by 2012 [45]. The
European Environmental Agency (EEA) [46, p17] states
that environmental action plans have been introduced in
MoPE in connection with the 2000 budget but adds that
there appears to be no system for conducting reviews or
audits on the plans. Regarding EPI and the Norwegian
renewable electricity policy, Knudsen [14, p124]
concludes that “Denmark and Sweden—though
differing on their choice of governing mechanisms and
policy instruments—are clearly more advanced with
respect to RES-E/EPI than Norway” (“RES-E”
representing electricity from renewable sources).
The data and discussion in this article expands on the
conclusions above; the Norwegian licensing system has
not, so far, pushed the introduction of wind power in
Norway. On the contrary, the pace in the process has
been slow and the outcomes to a certain degree
unpredictable. The tools introduced to separate “god”
projects from “bad” has not worked; it is simply unclear
how EPI works in the Norwegian wind power policy.
4.3. Investor risk
Investors do not share internal risk evaluations with the
public. Nevertheless, there are many indications on how
investors evaluate opportunities in the Norwegian wind
power market. Shell Renewables sold its wind power
projects in Norway (Moifjellet) to Statkraft already in
2008 [47], and Statoil sold off its onshore wind power
projects to Zephyr in 2010 [48] and left the joint venture
company Sarepta in 2011 [49]. The remaining actors are
mainly the Norwegian publicly owned utilities:
Statkraft, which is owned by the government, and the
regional companies, which, in general are owned by
counties and municipalities. However, Statkraft is at the
moment investing heavily in Sweden through the
company Statkraft SCA Vind (vindkraftnorr.se) and in
United Kingdom through a joint venture with Statoil
(scira.co.uk). Statkraft’s initiatives in Sweden are
interesting owing to the fact that Swedish and
Norwegian projects are exposed to almost the same
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market terms - a common exchange for electric power
and a common electrical certificate market. The regional
utilities BKK (bkk.no) and Sognekraft (sognekraft.no),
which are cooperating through the company Vestavind,
have expressed reduced interest in further development
of wind power in Norway [50]. More than two years
after MoPE’s approval of the projects in Bjerkreim,
Agder Energi, Lyse, Norsk Vind Energi, Statskog and
Fred Olsen Renewables (e.g. the players behind the
projects), still hesitates to realise the projects. A couple
of the utilities in Troms and Nordland, which own the
joint venture Nord-Norsk Vindkraft, have decided to
wind up the companies ambitious wind power activities
after MoPE’s refusal for the project Sleneset [51]. The
project had then been in the governmental pipeline for
eight years [19].
However, the developers could obviously have been
more critical regarding environmental concerns in their
project development. There are lot of examples where
severe conflicts with biodiversity have been revealed in
the early stages of the project, and consequently never
should have been put into the governmental pipeline.
This type of opportunistic behaviour, however, can also
be seen as an effect of the licencing system; - if others
investors get projects approved despite the TCA grade
E, why not try? As such, investors face a rather
uncertain decision system, where it is unclear how
EPI—among other factors through TCAs—actually
works in wind power projects. Additionally, the lack of
insight in the trade-offs between the two involved
ministries prevents an open learning process—a process
needed for adjustments in the investors’ development
practise. Nilsson [52] states that shaping institutions for
learning are an important element in EPI, and the EEA
[46] calls attention to that “existing weaknesses in the
system should be addressed in what is a learning by
doing process”. Moreover, a slow, reluctant decision-
making process behind closed doors does not contribute
to an open debate, which is an important element for
social acceptance of wind power.
Still, it could not be claimed that the licencing process
is the only reason for the investors’ reduced focus on the
Norwegian wind power market. As an example Buan 
et al. [53] have investigated factors that motivate
investments in renewable energy in Norway, Sweden
and Scotland and claim that variations in national
support schemes appear to have the most significant
effect on investment rates. However, based on the
findings in this article this conclusion could be
questioned; As mentioned above, Norwegian and
Swedish investors have, since 2011, faced the same
support system. Moreover, the power prices have been
equal in the two countries since the late 1990-ies.
Despite this, wind power is still expanding rapidly in
Sweden, while investments in Norway continue to be
modest. Investors in Sweden have, in the third quarter
2014 only, decided to order 220 MW of new capacity
[54], while the prognoses for new installed capacity in
Norway in 2015 is only 10 MW [55] (figures for ordered
capacity in Norway are not available).
An interesting subject for further research is to
question if changes in the Norwegian regional utilities’
financial situation, because of high demand for share
dividend from the public owners during the last years,
has impacted on the utilities engagement in wind power.
Another question to ask is if a potential conservatism, a
path dependency, in the Norwegian energy market,
dominated by traditional hydro power producers, could
be an explanatory factor behind lack of investments in
wind power in Norway.
5. Conclusions, and what about the future?
Data from NVE and MoPE demonstrates that the case-
handling time for applications in general is long and
somewhat unpredictable. The example from Bjerkreim
supports this conclusion. The duration of the licensing
process for most projects, the cue of appeals in the
MoPE, and the somewhat unexpected outcomes in the
final decisions indicates that there are wide-ranging
discussions between MoCE and MoPE and not a
common understanding of how EPI should work in
wind power policy. Statements to the press from the
Minister in charge of MoCE in 2012 illustrate that the
government realises the problem regarding case-
handling time and lack of clear criteria how to balance
different issues [31]. Political controversy, i.e.,
departments fighting for separate interests, seems also
to be a challenge, and the coordination is probably
even more challenging when a coalition between
different political parties is in position.
The Bjerkreim case demonstrates that evaluations
performed by the sectorial directorates are not central
when the final resolution is made. Additionally, the
Bjerkreim case demonstrates MoCE’s somewhat diffuse
role in the licencing process for wind power: the minister
in charge has no legal power but makes clear statements
to the press regarding the process and final resolution.
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From the investors’ point of view, the emphasizing of
environmental concerns, EPI in practise, in the
Norwegian licencing process is not easy to understand -
TCAs, IAs, county plans and so on—what are seen as
EPI tools – are not discussed or opposed in the final
governmental resolutions. Thus, it is likely that the
Norwegian government’s somehow indistinct effecting
of EPI in the licencing processes, has challenged the
investors patience, introduced an extra risk element in
the market and contributed to reduced interest for
investments in Norwegian wind power. These findings
from Norway might be interesting for policymakers in
other countries that want to push wind power
investments. Hopefully it could also widen the scientific
understanding of important factors for investments in
renewable energy. So far – support systems have got the
attention, while the significance of streamlined
administrative procedures has been a partly underrated
subject. However, a number of scientists have
contributed, for instance Lüthi and Prässler which report
interesting results from a survey among 102
international investors in Europe and the US. The survey
verifies that the quality and duration of administrative
processes are important factors when investors are
evaluating the attractiveness of different markets for
investments in renewable energy. Among other things
they express that 7 years in the administrative pipeline
could be a knock-out criterion [56, p4883]. The learning
from Norway seems to support the results from this
survey.
Bringing the wind power investors back to business
could be a challenge. An important issue is to clarify how
environmental concerns are emphasised in the decision-
making. Investors require a predictable licensing system
regarding time consumed and final conclusion; the
governmental balancing between the conflicting interests
in wind power, or EPI in practice, should be more
traceable. Additionally, there is a need for better
guidelines and better routines to separate “good” projects
from “bad” projects in an early stage of the process. A
proposal could be to strengthen and clarify the TCAs’
role in the process. The NGO Bellona [35], among
others, promotes this idea. A more controversial proposal
could be to limit MoPE’s role to a control of the legality
in the process; and hand over the responsibility for the
professional judgment and balancing of interests to
sectorial departments. Handling of appeals could also be
performed by court of law, like in the Swedish system
(vindlov.no). Such a change would possibly increase
predictability for the investors; a professional or 
legal process is, by its character, easier to foresee than
a political process. Political preferences could be
altered after elections, negotiations between the
political parties or by rearrangements in the
government, while legal processes are more transparent
and establish precedent for future cases. Another
improvement could be to limit the access to appeal
NVE’s resolutions; - the existing arrangement, under
which anybody could appeal NVE’s resolutions to
MoPE, creates a bottleneck in the process.
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